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Abstract. Much attention has been given to efficient computation of pairings on elliptic curves with
even embedding degree since the advent of pairing-based cryptography. The existing few works in the
case of odd embedding degrees require some improvements. This paper considers the computation
of optimal ate pairings on elliptic curves of embedding degrees k = 9, 15 and 27 which have twists
of order three. Mainly, we provide a detailed arithmetic and cost estimation of operations in the
tower extensions field of the corresponding extension fields. A good selection of parameters enables
us to improve the theoretical cost for the Miller step and the final exponentiation using the lattice-
based method comparatively to the previous few works that exist in these cases. In particular for
k = 15 and k = 27 we obtained an improvement, in terms of operations in the base field, of up to
25% and 29% respectively in the computation of the final exponentiation. Also, we obtained that
elliptic curves with embedding degree k = 15 present faster results than BN12 curves at the 128-bit
security levels. We provided a MAGMA implementation in each case to ensure the correctness of
the formulas used in this work.
Key words: Optimal Pairings, Miller’s algorithm, Extension fields arithmetic, Final exponentia-
tion.
1 Introduction
2 Introduction
Pairings are bilinear maps defined on the group of rational points of elliptic or hyper elliptic
curves [43]. They enable to realise many cryptographic protocols such as the Identity-Based
Cryptosystem [10], Identity-Based Encryption [12], the Identity-Based Undeniable Signature
[32], Short Signatures [11] or Broadcast Encryption [21]. A survey of some applications of pairings
can be found in [16], [9, Chapter X]. These many applications justify the research on the efficient
computation of pairings. Generally, let E be an ordinary elliptic curve defined over a finite field
Fp and r a large prime divisor of the order of the group E(Fp). The embedding degree of
E with respect to r and the prime number p is the smallest integer k such that r | pk − 1.
The ρ- value of the elliptic curve E is the value logp/logr measuring the size of the base field
relatively to the size r of a subgroup of E(Fp). The Tate pairing and its variants are the most
⋆ This work was supported in part by French ANR SIMPATIC project and LIRIMA-MACISA. The third author
acknowledges support from The Simons Foundations through Pole of Research in Mathematics with applications
to Information Security, Sub-Saharan Africa
used in cryptography. They map two linearly independent points of the subgroup of order r
of E(Fpk) to the group of r-th roots of unity in the finite field Fpk . The computation of the
Tate pairing and its variants consists of an application of the Miller algorithm [38] and a final
exponentiation. Efficient computation of pairings requires construction of pairing-friendly elliptic
curves over Fp with prescribed embedding degree k (see for example [8] or [18]) and efficient
arithmetic in the towering fields associated to Fpk (see [29], [22], [27], [14]). A lot of work has
been done for shortening the Miller loop leading to the concept of pairing lattices [24], or the
optimal pairing described by Vercauteren which can be computed with the smallest number of
iterations in the Miller algorithm [42]. Due to these advances, the final exponentiation step has
became a serious task. In this work, we concentrate on elliptic curves E over Fp with embedding
degree 9, 15 and 27. These curves admit twists of degree three which enable computations to
Security Bit length of Bit length of k k
level r pk ρ ≈ 1 ρ ≈ 2
80 160 960− 1280 6− 8 3− 4
128 256 3000− 5000 12− 20 6− 10
192 384 8000 − 10000 20− 26 10− 13
256 512 14000 − 18000 28− 36 14− 18
Table 1. Bit sizes of curves parameters and corresponding embedding degrees to obtain commonly desired levels
of security.
be done in subfields and also lead to the denominator elimination technique. To our knowledge
just few works ([31], [39] and [44]) exist in these cases and much attention have been given
only to elliptic curves with even embedding degree (see for example [1],[19],[20], [36]). Also,
another motivation to our work is the recent results on the resolution of discrete logarithm
problem [28]. Indeed according to the first analysis of this article, as for instance in [23],[4] the
security level for elliptic curves with friable embedding degree should be taken greater than
those presented in Table 1. The main consequence is that elliptic curves with embedding degree
12 or 18 may not be the one assuring a nice ratio between the security level and the arithmetic.
Elliptic curves with odd embedding degree could become interesting and more efficient than
elliptic curves with even embedding degree. Also it is also noticed that elliptic curves with odd
embedding degree especially with k = 27 may be suitable for computing product of pairings
[44]. In this work we consider the following parameter’s sizes (p ≈ 2343, r ≈ 2257, ρ = 1.33),
(p ≈ 2575, r ≈ 2385, ρ = 1.5), (p ≈ 2579, r ≈ 2514, ρ = 1.12) for curves with k = 9, 15, 27
respectively. This corresponds to the 128, 192 and 256-bit security levels respectively according
to recommendations in Table 1 [18]. However, considering the recent recommendations based on
the advances on Discrete Logarithm computation with the Number Field Sieve (NFS) algorithm
and its variants ([28], [5], [37], [4]) the security level provided by the above parameters may
reduce. Indeed, let 2−dexp((c+ o(1))(logQ)1/3( log logQ)2/3 where d and c are constants, be the
runing time of the NFS algorithm, with Q = pk. The base-two logarithm of this runtime with
(o(1) = 0) gives S(Q, c, d) = c(lge)(logQ)1/3(loglogQ)2/3 − d. We then know that the constants
c and d, the embedding degree k and the security level l must satisfy the following Pollard-Rho
security and variants of NFS security constraints logQ/k ≥ 2ρl and S(Q, c, d) ≥ l. Therefore
the previous parameters provide a security level of 109, 168, 214 bits instead of 128, 192, 256-bit
respectively for curves with k = 9, 15, 27. But for now we still consider in Section 5, 6 and 7
recommendation from Table 1 in order to make a fair comparison with previous works. Later in
section 9, we consider advances in discrete logarithm computation and provide tentative updated
parameters at the 128, 192, 256 bits respectively for curves with k = 9, 15, 27. So we proposed a
detailed arithmetic in the towering fields associated to the fields Fp9 ,Fp15 and Fp27 . The lattice-
based method explained by Fuentes et al. [19] is applied to compute the final exponentiation in
the cases k = 9, 15. We also find a simple expression and explicit cost evaluation for the optimal
pairing in the cases k = 9 and k = 15 comparatively to the work in [39]. The results obtained
are an improvement with respect to previous works [31], [39] and [44] respectively for k = 9, 15
and 27. Precisely, our contributions (see Table 3 and subsection 9.4 for comparison) in this work
are:
1. Determination of an explicit cost of the computation of the optimal pairing for elliptic curves
stated above. This includes a good selection of parameters for a shorter Miller loop and an
efficient exponentiation. In particular, we saved one inversion in Fp27 for the computation of
the Miller loop in the case k = 27.
2. Details on the arithmetic in the tower of subfields of Fp9,Fp15 and Fp27 . Especially, we give
the cost of the computation of Frobenius maps and Inversions in the cyclotomic subgroups
of F∗p9,F
∗
p15 and F
∗
p27 , (see Appendices A, B and C).
3. Improvement of the costs of the final exponentiation by saving 828M1 + 145S1, 1170M1 +
7767S1 and 8676M1 + 32136S1 operations for elliptic curves of embedding degrees 9, 15 and
27 respectively, comparatively to previous works in these cases; where Mk, Sk represent the
costs of multiplication and squaring in the finite field Fpk .
4. In Section 9 we look for new parameters considering the advances in Discrete Logarithm
computation to update the cost of the optimal ate pairings on the studied curves at the
128, 192 and 256-bit security levels. We then compare our results with known curves such as
BN and BLS curves. In particular we obtained that elliptic curves with embedding degree
k = 15 present faster results than BN12 curves at the 128-bit security levels.
We also provide a MAGMA implementation in each case to ensure the correctness of the formulas
used in this work. The code is available in [17].
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 3 we briefly present the Tate and
ate pairings together with the Miller algorithm for their efficient computation, we also recall the
concept of optimal ate pairing and the lattice-based method for computing the final exponen-
tiation. Sections 5, 6 and 7 present arithmetic in subfields, and costs estimation of the Miller
step and the final exponentiation when considering the embedding degrees k = 9, 15 and 27
respectively. Each of these sections includes a comparative analysis with previous work. Section
8 presents a general comparison of the results obtained in this work and the previous results
in the literature. In Section 9 we look for new parameters considering the advances in Discrete
Logarithm computation to update the cost of the optimal ate pairings on the studied curves at
the 128, 192 and 256-bit security levels. We then compare our results with known curves such
as BN and BLS curves. We conclude the work in Section 10 in which we suggest as future work
the search for parameters to have subgroup secure ordinary curves [6] and to ensure protection
against small-subgroup attacks[34].
Notations
The following notations are used in this work.
Mk, Sk, Ik : Cost of multiplication, squaring and inversion in the field Fpk , for any integer k.
3 Background and previous works
3.1 Pairings and the Miller Algorithm
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fp, a finite field of characteristic p > 3. Let r be a
large prime factor of the group order of the elliptic curve. Let m ∈ Z and P ∈ E(Fp)[r] a
point of E of order r with coordinates in Fp. Let fm,P a function with divisor Div (fm,P ) =
m(P ) − ([m]P ) − (m − 1)(O) where O denotes the identity element of the group of points of
the elliptic curve. We denote k the smallest integer such that r divides pk − 1, also called the
embedding degree of E with respect to r. We also consider the point Q ∈ E(Fpk)[r] of E of order
r with coordinates in Fpk and denote µr the group of r-th roots of unity in F
∗
pk
. The reduced
Tate pairing er is a bilinear and non degenerate map defined as
er : E(Fp)[r]× E(Fpk)[r]→ µr, (P,Q) 7→ fr,P (Q)
pk−1
r
To define a variant of the Tate pairing called ate pairing [25], let’s denote [i] : P 7−→ [i]P the
endomorphism defined on E(Fp) which consists to add P to itself i times. Let πp : E
(
Fp
)
→
E
(
Fp
)
, (x, y) 7→ (xp, yp) be the Frobenius endomorphism on the curve where Fp is the algebraic
closure of the finite field Fp. The relation between the trace t of the Frobenius endomorphism
and the group order is given by [43, Theorem 4.3]: ♯E(Fp) = p + 1 − t and πp has exactly two
eigenvalues 1 and p. This enables to consider P ∈ G1 = E
(
Fp
)
[r]∩ Ker(πp − [1]) = E(Fp)[r]
and Q ∈ G2 = E
(
Fp
)
[r]∩ Ker(πp − [p]). The ate pairing is defined as follows:
eA : G2 ×G1 → µr; (Q,P ) 7→ ft−1,Q(P )
pk−1
r .
In all variants of pairings, one needs a value fm,U (V ) which is efficiently computed thanks
to the Miller algorithm [38]. Indeed denote hR,S a rational function with divisor Div(hR,S) =
(R)+(S)−(S+R)−(O) where R and S are two arbitrary points on the elliptic curve. In the case
of elliptic curves in Weierstrass form, hR,S =
ℓR,S
vR+S
where ℓR,S is the straight line containing R
and S and vR+S is the corresponding vertical line passing through R+S. Miller uses the double-
and-add method as the addition chains for m (see [3, Chapter 9] for more details on addition
chains) to compute f := fm,U(V ). Write m = mn2
n+...+m12+m0 > 0 withmi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, the
(modified) Miller algorithm that efficiently computes the pairing fm,U(V )
(pk−1)/r of two points
U and V is given as follows:
1: Set f ← 1 and R← U
2: For i = n− 1 down to 0 do
3: f ← f2 · hR,R(V ), R← 2R Doubling step
5: if mi = 1 then
6: f ← f · hR,U (V ) R← R+ U , end if Addition step
7: if mi = −1 then
8: f ← f/hR,U (V ) R← R− U , end for Addition step
10: return e = f
pk−1
r Final exponentiation
The use of twists enables to efficiently do some computations during the execution of this
algorithm as we explain in the next section.
3.2 Use of Twists
Twists of elliptic curves enable to efficiently compute pairings. Indeed, in the Miller algorithm
the doubling of a point (line 3) and the addition of points (lines 6 and 8) are done in the
extension field Fpk in the case of the ate pairing. The use of twists enables to perform these
operations rather in a subfield of Fpk and also leads to the denominator elimination. More pre-
cisely, a twist of an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field Fp is an elliptic curve E
′ defined
over Fp which is isomorphic to E over an algebraic closure of Fp. The smallest integer d such
that E and E′ are isomorphic over Fpd is called the degree or the order of the twist. Elliptic
curves of embedding degree k = 9, 15 and k = 27 admit twists of order three. Explicit con-
structions of such curves can be found in [35], [15] and [7]. The general equation of these curves
is given by E : y2 = x3 + b. The equation defining the twist E′ has the form y2 = x3 + bω6
where {1, ω, ω2} is the basis of the Fpk/3-vector space Fpk and the isomorphism between E
′
and E is ψ : E′ −→ E; (x′, y′) 7−→ (x′/ω2, y′/ω3). Using this isomorphism, points Q in G2
can be instead taken as (xω−2, yω−3) where (x, y) ∈ E′(Fpk/3). The function hR,S is defined by
hR,S(x, y) =
y+λ(xR−x)−yR
x−xR+S
where λ is the slope of the line passing through R and S. Observe
that using the equation of the curve y2 = x3 + b one has x − xR+S =
y2−y2R+S
x2+xR+Sx+x
2
R+S
. In the
present case of ate pairing, the addition R + S is performed in the extension field Fpk and the
function hR,S is evaluated at a point (xP , yP ) ∈ E(Fp). So using the twist, the points R, S
and R + S are taken in the form (xω−2, yω−3) where (x, y) ∈ E′(Fpk/3). Therefore we have
hR,S(xP , yP ) =
(yPω
5+λ(xRω
2
−xPω
4)−yRω
2)(x2P ω
4+xR+SxPω
2+x2R+P )
y2Pω
9
−y2R+Pω
3 . We observe that the denomi-
nator is an element of the subfield Fpk/3 and so will be sent to 1 during the final exponentiation
(line 10 in the Miller algorithm) since pk/3− 1 is a factor of (pk − 1)/r. Consequently we simply
ignore that denominator in the Miller algorithm for an efficient computation. More details on
twists can be found in [13].
3.3 Optimal Pairings
The reduction of Miller’s loop length is an important way to improve the computation of pairings.
The latest work is a generalized method to find the shortest loop, which leads to the concept
of optimal pairings due to Vercauteren [42]. Let λ = mr be a multiple of r such that r ∤ m and
write λ =
∑l
i=0 cip
i = h(p), (h(z) ∈ Z[z]). Recall that hR,S is the Miller function defined in
section 3.1. For i = 0, · · · l set si =
∑l
j=i cjp
j; then the map
eo : G2 ×G1 → µr
(Q,P ) 7−→
(∏l
i=0 f
pi
ci,Q
(P ) ·
∏l−1
i=0 h[si+1]Q,[cipi]Q(P )
) pk−1
r
(1)
defines a bilinear pairing and non degenerate if
mkpk 6= ((pk − 1)/r) ·
∑l
i=0 icip
i−1 mod r.
The coefficients ci : i = 0, · · · , l can be obtained from the short vectors obtained from the lattice
L =


r 0 0 · · · 0
−p 1 0 · · · 0
−p2 0 1 · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
−pφ(k)−1 0 0 · · · 1


(2)
3.4 Final Exponentiation and the Lattice-Based Method for its Computation
The result of the Miller loop’s step is raised to the power p
k
−1
r . This step is called the final expo-
nentiation (line 10 in Miller’s algorithm). The efficient computation of the final exponentiation
has became a serious task. Observe that this exponent can be divided into two parts as follows:
pk − 1
r
=
[
pk − 1
φk(p)
]
·
[
φk(p)
r
]
where φk(x) is the k-th cyclotomic polynomial. The final exponentiation is therefore computed
as f
pk−1
r =
[
f
pk−1
φk(p)
]φk(p)
r
. The computation of the first part A = f
pk−1
φk(p) is generally inexpensive
as it consists of few multiplications, inversion and p-th powering in Fpk . The second part A
φk(p)
r
is considered more difficult and is called the hard part. An efficient method to compute the
hard part is described by Scott et al. [40]. They suggested to write d = φk(p)r in base p as
d = d0+d1p+ ...+dφ(k)−1p
φ(k)−1 and find a short vectorial addition chains to compute Ad much
more efficiently than the naive method. In [19], based on the fact that a fixed power of a pairing
is still a pairing, Fuentes et al.[19] suggested to apply Scott et al.’s method with a power of any
multiple d′ of d with r not dividing d′. This could lead to a more efficient exponentiation than
computing Ad directly. Their idea of finding the polynomial d′(x) is to apply the LLL-algorithm
to the matrix formed by Q-linear combinations of the elements d(x), xd(x), ..., xdegr−1d(x). They
successfully applied the method in the case of elliptic curves of embedding degrees 8, 12 and
18 [19]. In Sections 5 and 6 we apply this method to improve the computation of the final
exponentiation for elliptic curves of embedding degree k = 9 and 15. A clever method was used
by Zhang et al. [44] to compute the final exponentiation in the case k = 27.
4 Arithmetic in the tower of subfields of Fp9, Fp27 and Fp15
A pairing is computed as an element of the extension field Fpk . But its efficient computation
depends on the arithmetic of subfields of Fpk which is generally organised as tower of subfields
extensions. In this section we recall the tower extension of finite fields Fp9 ,Fp27 and Fp15 . We
also give explicit cost of the arithmetic operations. For extension-field arithmetic in Fp9 and
Fp27 we consider p ≡ 1 mod 3 motivated by the work of Barreto et al. [7] on the construction
of elliptic curves of embedding degree 9 and 27. This implies that Fpk can be represented as
Fpk/3 [X]/(X
3 − α), for k = 3i, i = 1, 2, 3 where α is a cubic non residue modulo p. We choose
p such that X3 − 7 is irreducible over Fp. Therefore cubic extensions will be constructed using
the polynomials X3 − αi where αi = 7
1/3i−1 . A tower extension for Fp27 together with the one
for Fp9 are then given by:
Fp3 = Fp[u] with u
3 = 7
Fp9 = Fp3 [v] with v
3 = 71/3
Fp27 = Fp9 [w] with w
3 = 71/9
The costs of the computation of the Frobenius maps and cyclotomic inversions are given in
Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 for the extension Fp9, Fp27 , and Fp15 respectively. The proof
of these Lemmas are given in Appendix A, B and C.
Lemma 1 In the finite field Fp9,
1. The computation of the p3; p6-Frobenius maps costs 6M1
2. The computation of the p; p2; p4; p5; p7; p8-Frobenius maps costs 8M1
3. The inverse of an element α of the Gφ3(p3)-order cyclotomic subgroup is computed as α
−1 =
αp
3
· αp
6
and the cost is 36S1
Similarly, in the finite field Fp27 the Lemma 2 gives the costs of the computation of the
Frobenius maps and cyclotomic inversions.
Lemma 2 In the finite field Fp27,
1. The computation of the p3; p6; p9-Frobenius maps costs 18M1
2. The computation of the p; p2; p4; p5; p7; p8-Frobenius maps costs 26M1
3. The inverse of an element α of the Gφ3(p9)-order cyclotomic subgroup is computed as α
−1 =
αp
9
· αp
18
and the cost is 216S1
In the case of Fp15 , we consider pairing friendly curves over Fp where p ≡ 1 mod 5 [15].
According to [33, Theorem 3.75] the polynomial X5 − α is irreducible over Fp[X] if and only if
α is neither a cubic root nor a fifth root in Fp. A tower extension for Fp15 can be constructed as
follows:
Fp5 = Fp[u] with u
5 = 7
Fp15 = Fp5 [v] with v
3 = u. where u ∈ Fp5
Our main contribution in this section is the computation of Frobenius maps and the inversions
in the φn(.)-order cyclotomic subgroup of F
∗
pk
. The costs of the computation of the Frobenius
maps and cyclotomic inversions are given in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 In the finite field Fp15,
1. The computation of the p5; p10-Frobenius maps costs 10M1
2. The computation of the p; p2; p3; p4; p6; p7; p8; p9-Frobenius maps costs 14M1
3. The inverse of an element α of the Gφ3(p5)-order cyclotomic subgroup is computed as α
−1 =
αp
5
· αp
10
and the cost is 54S1
In Table 2 we summarise the overall cost of operations in the tower of subfields described
above. The costs for squaring, multiplication and inversion are from [31], [39] and [44] respectively
for k = 9, 15 and 27. Explicit details of the cost of Frobenius maps and inversions in the
cyclotomic subgroups are given in Appendix A, B and C.
Fields Operations Costs
Fp3
Multiplication M3 6M1
Squaring S3 5S1
Inversion I3 I1 + 9M1 + 2S1
Fp9
Multiplication M9 36M1
Squaring S9 25S1
Inversion I9 I1 + 63M1 + 12S1
Frobenius p3; p6 6M1
Frobenius p; p2; p4; p5; p7; p8 8M1
Inversion in Gφ3(p3) 18M1 + 15S1
Fp27
Multiplication M27 216M1
Squaring S27 125S1
Inversion I27 I1 + 387M1 + 62S1
Frobenius p3; p6; p9 18M1
Frobenius p; p2; p4; p5; p7; p8 26M1
Inversion in Gφ3(p9) 108M1 + 75S1
Fp5
Multiplication M5 9M1
Squaring S5 9S1
Inversion I5 1I1 + 45M1 + 5S1
Fp15
Multiplication M15 45M1
Squaring S15 45S1
Inversion I15 1I1 + 126M1+
23S1
Frobenius p5; p10 10M1
Frobenius p; p2; p3; p4; p6; p7; p8; p9 14M1
Inversion in Gφ3(p5) 27M1 + 27S1
Table 2. Cost of operations in extension fields from [31], [39] and [44] and this work (see Appendix A, B and C)
5 Elliptic Curves with Embedding Degree 9
This section describes the computation of the optimal ate pairing (Miller step and the final
exponentiation) on the parameterized elliptic curve defined in [35]. The correctness of the results
can be verified with the MAGMA code available in [17]. This family of elliptic curves has
embedding degree 9 and a ρ-value 1.33 and is parameterized by :
p = ((x+ 1)2 + ((x− 1)2(2x3 + 1)2)/3)/4
r = (x6 + x3 + 1)/3
t = x+ 1
(3)
5.1 Optimal ate pairing
Based on the general framework described by Vercauteren in [42], the short vector obtained from
the lattice L defined by equation (2) gives the optimal function h(z) =
∑5
i=0 ciz
i = x−z ∈ Z[z].
A straightforward application of formula (1) yields the optimal pairing
eo : G2 ×G1 −→ µr
(Q,P ) 7−→ fx,Q(P )
p9−1
r
5.2 Cost of the execution of the Miller loop
The Miller loop consists of the doubling steps (line 3 in the Miller algorithm) and addition steps
(line 6 or 8 in the Miller algorithm). These steps use the Miller function hR,S either in affine
coordinates or in projective coordinates. The work of Zhang et al. [44, Section 3] presents the
currently fastest formulas in projective coordinates. The doubling step costs 9M1 + 3M3 + 9S3
and the cost of the addition step is 9M1+12M3+5S3. For an explicit cost of the computation of
fx,Q(P ), we wrote a Pari/GP code to find a suitable x with low Hamming weight and minimal
number of bits for the 128 bit-security level according to Table 1. The best value we were able to
find is x = 243+237+27+1 which gives an r(x) prime of 257 bits and p(x) a prime of 343 bits.
The values p and x are both congruent to 1 modulo 6 so that the corresponding elliptic curve
is y2 = x3 + 1 [31]. The computation of fx,Q(P ) therefore costs 43 doubling steps, 3 additions,
42 squaring and 45 multiplications in Fp9 . Thus the total cost for the computation of the Miller
loop for the optimal pairing on elliptic curves of embedding degree 9 is 43(9M1 +3M3 +9S3) +
3(9M1 +12M3 +5S3) + 42S9 +45M9. This is equal to 45M9 +165M3 +414M1 +42S9 +402S3.
Using the arithmetic in Table 2, the overall cost is 3024M1+3060S1. To our knowledge, no other
explicit cost with a specific value of x is reported in the literature.
5.3 Cost of the computation of the final exponentiation
As explained in Section 3, the final exponentiation in this case can be divided as f (p
9
−1)/r =(
fp
3
−1
)(p6+p3+1)/r
=
(
fp
3
−1
)d
. We then used the lattice method described by Fuentes et al.
[19] that we briefly explained in Section 3.4. It is applied to the following matrix in which the
coefficient 243 is used to obtain integer entries as d = (p6 + p3 + 1)/r is a polynomial with
rational coefficients
M =


243d(x)
243xd(x)
243x2d(x)
243x3d(x)
243x4d(x)
243x5d(x)


(4)
We obtain the following multiple of d: d′ = x3d = k0 + k1p + k2p
2 + k3p
3 + k4p
4 + k5p
5 where
the polynomials ki, i = 0, ..., 5 are as follows
k0 = −x
4 + 2x3 − x2, k1 = −x
3 + 2x2 − x, k2 = −x
2 + 2x− 1,
k3 = x
7 − 2x6 + x5 + 3, k4 = x
6 − 2x5 + x4, k5 = x
5 − 2x4 + x3
They verify the relations (see the code in [17] for verification)
k2 = −(x− 1)
2, k1 = xk2, k0 = xk1, k5 = −xk0, k4 = xk5, k3 = xk4 + 3
If we set A = fp
3
−1 then
– The cost for the computation of A is 1 p3-Frobenius, 1 Inversion in Fp9 and 1 multiplication
in Fp9 .
– The cost of the computation of Ak0 , Ak1 and Ak4 is 3 exponentiations by x,
– The cost of the computation of Ak5 is one inversion in the cylotomic subgroup and one
exponentiation by x.
– The cost of the computation of Ak2 is one inversion in the cyclotomic subgroup and two
exponentiations by (x− 1).
– The cost of the computation of Ak3 is 2 multiplications, one squaring and one exponentiation
by x.
Note that the inversion in the cyclotomic subgroup Gφ3(p3) of order p
6 + p3 + 1 is computed as
A−1 = Ap
3
· Ap
6
(see Appendix A for details and cost). The cost for the hard part Ad
′
is then
2 exponentiations by x − 1, 5 exponentiations by x, 7 multiplications in Fp9 , one squaring in
Fp9 , two cyclotomic inversions IGφ3(p3)
and p, p2, p3, p4, p5-Frobenius maps. Using the value of x
given above, one exponentiation by x costs 43S9 + 3M9 whereas one exponentiation by x − 1
costs 43S9 + 2M9. Finally the hard part costs 2(43S9 + 2M9) + 5(43S9 + 3M9) + 7M9 + 1S9 +
2IGφ3(p3)
= 302S9 + 26M9 + 2IGφ3(p3)
and p, p2, p3, p4, p5-Frobenius maps. The total cost of the
final exponentiation is 1I9 + 27M9 + 302S9 + 2IGφ3(p3)
and p, p2, 2 ∗ p3, p4, p5-Frobenius maps.
5.4 Improvement and comparison with previous work
From the results in [31], the hard part costs 309S9 + 50M9 and p, p
2, p3, p4, p5-Frobenius maps.
If we include the cost 1I9 +1M9 and p
3-Frobenius for the easy part and using the arithmetic in
Table 2, the overall cost is I1+1115M1+7592S1 for this work and I1+1943M1+7737S1 for Le
et al. [31]. We therefore save 828M1 +145S1 comparatively to their work. Although the sizes of
p are 343 bits in this work and 348 bits in [31], the cost of a multiplication is almost the same
in the two corresponding fields (see section 9.4).
6 Elliptic Curves with Embedding Degree 15
In this section we give explicit formulas together with their cost for the Miller loop in the
computation of the optimal ate pairing. We then compute the cost of the final exponentiation
on the parameterized elliptic curve defined in [15]. The correctness of the results can be verified in
[17]. This family of elliptic curves has embedding degree 15 and a ρ-value 1.5 and is parameterized
by :
p = (x12 − 2x11 + x10 + x7 − 2x6 + x5 + x2 + x+ 1)/3
r = x8 − x7 + x5 − x4 + x3 − x+ 1
t = x+ 1
(5)
6.1 Optimal ate pairing
The Vercauteren approach described in [42] enabled us to obtain the short vector from the lattice
L defined by equation (2) which lead to the optimal function h(z) =
∑5
i=0 ciz
i = x− z ∈ Z[z].
A straightforward application of formula (1) yields the optimal pairing
eo : G2 ×G1 −→ µr
(Q,P ) 7−→ fx,Q(P )
p15−1
r
6.2 Cost of the computation of the Miller loop
In this section, we consider the Miller function given in affine coordinates, following the analysis
of Lauter et al. [30] who suggested to use affine coordinates at higher security level. Miller
function used for the computation of fx,Q(P ) in this case is described in [44, Table 2] with
the fastest cost to date. At 192 bits security level on elliptic curves with k = 15, the best
value of x we were able to find with a Pari/GP code is x = 248 + 241 + 29 + 28 + 1. This
value gives an r(x) prime of 385 bits and p(x) of 575 bits which correspond to parameters
for 192-bit security level according to Table 1. The value of p is congruent to 1 modulo 5
and a curve equation can be y2 = x3 + 1. The Miller loop consists here of computing fx,Q
which costs 48 doubling steps, 4 additions steps, 47 squaring and 51 multiplications in Fp15 .
Considering the currently fastest cost for doubling and addition step in [44, Table 2], the Miller
loop costs 48(15M1 + 3M5 + 2S5 + I5) + 4(15M1 + 3M5 + 2S5 + I5) + 47S15 + 51M15, which is
51M15 + 156M5 + 780M1 + 47S15 + 104S5 + 52I5. Using the arithmetic in Table 2, the overall
cost is 52I1 + 6819M1 + 3311S1. To our knowledge no explicit cost is reported in the literature
in the case k = 15 with a specific value of x.
6.3 Cost of the computation of the final exponentiation
The final exponentiation in this case is written in a different way as f (p
15
−1)/r =
(
fp
5
−1
)(p10+p5+1)/r
=(
fp
5
−1
)d
. This decomposition is used instead of p
15
−1
r =
[
p15−1
φ15(p)
]
·
[
φ15(p)
r
]
as usually done, for
efficiency reasons in the computation. Observe that p
15
−1
φ15(p)
= p7 + p6 + p5 − p2 − p − 1 and
φ15(p) = p
8 − p7 + p5 − p4 + p3 − p+ 1 will lead to several multiplications and Frobenius maps
operations. Thus the lattice method described by Fuentes et al. [19] that we briefly explained in
Section 3.4 is applied to the following matrix M . In the matrix M the coefficient 5904919683 is used
to obtain integer entries as d = (p10 + p5 + 1)/r is a polynomial with rational coefficients.
M =


59049
19683d(x)
59049
19683xd(x)
59049
19683x
2d(x)
.
.
59049
19683x
7d(x)


(6)
We then obtained the following multiple of d: d′ = 3x3d = k0+k1p+...k9p
9 where the polynomials
ki, i = 0, ..., 9 are defined as follows
k0 = −x
6 + x5 + x3 − x2, k1 = −x
5 + x4 + x2 − x
k2 = −x
4 + x3 + x− 1
k3 = x
11 − 2x10 + x9 + x6 − 2x5 + x4 − x3 + x2 + x+ 2
k5 = x
11 − x10 − x8 + x7 + 3
k4 = x
11 − x10 − x9 + x8 + x6 − x5 − x4 + x3 − x2 + 2x+ 2
k6 = x
10 − x9 − x7 + x6 k7 = x
9 − x8 − x6 + x5
k8 = x
8 − x7 − x5 + x4 k9 = x
7 − x6 − x4 + x3
The polynomials ki : i = 0, ...9 verify the relations (see the code in [17] for verification)
k2 = −(x− 1)
2(x2 + x+ 1), k1 = xk2, k0 = xk1
k9 = −xk0, k8 = xk9, k7 = xk8
k6 = xk7, k5 = xk6 + 3, k4 =M − (k1 + k7)
k3 =M − (k0 + k6 + k9) where M = (k2 + k5 + k8)
Set A = fp
5
−1 then
– The cost for the computation of A is 1 p5-Frobenius, 1 Inversion in Fp15 and 1 multiplication
in Fp15 and .
– The computation of Ak2 is 2 exponentiations by x, 2 exponentiations by x− 1, 2 multiplica-
tions and 1 cyclotomic inversion,
– The cost of the computation of the Ak0 ,Ak1 ,Ak6 ,Ak7 is 5 exponentiations by x, the compu-
tation of Ak9 costs 1 exponentiation by x and 1 cyclotomic inversion,
– The computation of Ak5 is 1 exponentiation by x, 2 multiplications and 1 squaring in Fp15 ,
– The computation of Ak4 costs 4 multiplications in Fp15 and 1 cyclotomic inversion,
– The computation of Ak3 costs 3 multiplications in Fp15 and 1 cyclotomic inversion.
Therefore, the cost of the computation of Ad
′
is 2 exponentiations by x − 1, 9 exponentia-
tions by x, 20 multiplications, one squaring in Fp15 , four inversions in the cyclotomic subgroup
Gφ3(p5) of order p
10 + p5 + 1 (note that A−1 = Ap
5
· Ap
10
see Appendix C for details) and
p, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8, p9-Frobenius maps. Using the value of x given above, the cost of the hard
part is 2(48S15+3M15)+9(48S15+4M15)+20M15+1S15+4IGφ3(p5)
= 529S15+62M15+4IGφ3(p5)
and p, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8, p9-Frobenius maps. The total cost of the final exponentiation in this
work is therefore 1I15+529S15+63M15+4IGφ3(p5)
and p, p2, p3, p4, 2∗p5, p6, p7, p8, p9-Frobenius
maps.
Remark 1. The cost given by Le et al. [31] for the hard part is 11 exponentiations by x, 22
multiplications, 2 inversions in Fp15 and 9 Frobenius maps. The authors said that the cost of
an inversion in Fp15 is free with a reference to a similar computation but on elliptic curves with
even embedding degree, unfortunately we do not see how this is possible. Also, they considered
an x of 64 bits and hamming weight 7 and claimed that the cost is 88M15 + 528S15 instead of
11(6M15+64S15) = 88M15+704S15. Therefore if we count the 2 inversions in Fp15 (these inverses
are in fact in the cyclotomic subgroup Gφ3(p5)), then their final cost is 88M15+704S15+2IGφ3(p5)
and 11 Frobenius maps, whereas our cost is 529S15 + 62M15 + 4IGφ3(p5)
.
6.4 Improvement and comparison with previous work
Considering the previous remark, the cost of the final exponentiation in [31] is 1I15 + 704S15 +
89M15 + 2IGφ3(p5)
and p, p2, p3, p4, 2 ∗ p5, p6, p7, p8, p9-Frobenius maps. We observe that we have
improved the results by saving 26M15 +175S15 − 2IGφ3(p5)
. Using the arithmetic in Table 2, the
overall cost is I1+3066M1+24071S1 for this work and I1+4236M1+31838S1 for Le et al. [31].
We therefore save 26M15 + 175S15 − 2IGφ3(p5)
= 1170M1 + 7767S1 comparatively to their work.
A MAGMA code for the implementation to ensure the correctness of the decomposition of the
final exponentiation and the Miller function is available in [17].
7 Elliptic Curves with Embedding Degree 27
The parameterized elliptic curves with embedding degree 27 is defined in [7]. This family has a
ρ-value 10/9 and is parameterized by the following polynomials:
p = 1/3(x − 1)2(x18 + x9 + 1) + x
r = 1/3(x18 + x9 + 1)
t = x+ 1
(7)
7.1 The Miller loop and the final exponentiation
The Miller loop and the final exponentiation has been studied in [44]. They found the optimal
function h(z) =
∑17
i=0 ciz
i = x− z ∈ Z[z] and the optimal pairing is given by
eo : G2 ×G1 −→ µr; (Q,P ) 7−→ fx,Q(P )
p27−1
r
The authors in [44] used the parameter x = 228+227+225+28−23 for their computation at 256-
bit security level. The cost of the Miller step that they obtained is therefore 28(3M9+2S9+1I9+
9M1)+4(3M9+2S9+1I9+9M1)+27(6S9)+30(6M9)+1I27 = 276M9+226S9+32I9+288M1+I27
operations. The computation of the final exponentiation in [44] requires 1I27+11M27, 17 powers
of x, 2 powers of x−1 and p, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8, 2∗p9-Frobenius maps. Therefore the explicit
cost of the final exponentiation is 1I27 + 17(4(6M9) + 28(6S9) + 36M1) + 2(5(6M9) + 28(6S9) +
36M1) + 11(6M9) + 228M1 = 1I27 + 648M9 + 3192S9 + 912M1.
Then the explicit cost for the computation of the Miller loop and the final exponentiation given
in that work is 12627M1 + 8670S1 + 33I1 and 24627M1 + 114998S1 + 1I1 respectively (see [44]
for details).
Remark 2. The negative coefficient in the value of x affects the efficiency since one full inversion
in Fp27 is required in the Miller algorithm (line 8) and also 19 inversions in the cyclotomic
subgroup are required when raising to the power of x during the final exponentiation.
In the next section we explain the choice of another parameter to avoid these additional opera-
tions.
7.2 Improvement and comparison with previous work
We use the arithmetic (especially the computation of inversion in the cyclotomic subgroup) and
a specific value of x to improve the costs in [44]. Precisely, a careful search with a Pari/GP
code enabled us to find the value x = 229 + 219 + 217 + 214 so that r has a prime factor of
514 bits length and the prime p has a bit length of 579 for 256-bit security level according to
Table 1. An adequate elliptic curve has the equation y2 = x3 − 2. Although the corresponding
base field is a bit larger (579 bits instead of 573 in [44], but m579 ≈ m573 see section 9.4
for notations) and we have an extra doubling step, we avoid the full inversion in Fp27 and 17
inversions in the cyclotomic subgroup Gφ3(p9) when raising to power x. We perform 2 inversions
in the cyclotomic subgroup only when raising to power x − 1. The cost of the Miller loop now
becomes 29(3M9 + 2S9 + 1I9 + 9M1) + 3(3M9 + 2S9 + 1I9 + 9M1) + 27(6S9) + 30(6M9) =
276M9 + 226S9 + 32I9 + 288M1. Using the arithmetic in Table 2, the overall cost for the Miller
loop is 32I1 + 12240M1 + 6034S1 for this work where we saved at least one inversion in Fp27 .
Our cost for the final exponentiation is 1I27 + 17(3(6M9) + 29(6S9)) + 2(4(6M9) + 29(6S9)) +
2IGφ3(p9)
+ 11(6M9) = 1I27 + 420M9 + 3306S9 + 2IGφ3(p9)
and p, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8, 2 ∗ p9-
Frobenius maps. Using the arithmetic in Table 2, the overall cost is I1+15951M1+82862S1 for
this work. The implementation of this pairing is available in [17].
8 General Comparison
In this section, we summarize the different costs obtained in this work and compare our results
with previous works.
If we assume that the cost of a squaring is the same as the cost of a multiplication then the
cost of the final exponentiation is I1 + 27137M1 and I1 + 36074M1 for this work and previous
work [31] respectively for k = 15. The theoretical improvement obtained in this work is therefore
up to 25%. A similar analysis with k = 9 yields an improvement of 8%. In the case of curves
with k = 27, our results present an improvement of 14% and 29% for the Miller loop and final
exponentiation respectively compare to the work in [44].
Curves References Miller loop Final Exponentiation
k = 9
Previous work [31] No specific cost reported I1 + 1943M1 + 7737S1
128-bit This work 3024M1 + 3060S1 I1 + 1115M1 + 7592S1
k = 15
Previous work [31] No specific cost reported I1 + 4263M1 + 31811S1
192-bit This work 52I1 + 6819M1 + 3311S1 I1 + 3093M1 + 24044S1
k = 27
Previous work [44] 33I1 + 12627M1 + 8670S1 I1 + 24627M1 + 114998S1
256-bit This work 32I1 + 12240M1 + 6034S1 I1 + 15951M1 + 82862S1
Table 3. Comparison of the cost of the Miller loop and the final exponentiation.
9 New Parameters for Optimal Ate pairing on Elliptic Curves with
embedding degrees 9, 15 and 27
In this section we consider new parameters for parameterized curves of embedding degrees
9, 15 and 27 at the 128, 192 and 256-bit security levels. We consider recent advances on the
computation of the discrete logarithm thanks to the Number Field Sieve (NFS) algorithm and
its variants described in some papers as mentioned in the introduction. Mostly, the paper of
Barbulescu and Duquesne [4] presents a detailed approach for computing new parameters for
pairings. Scott and Guillevic [41] have proposed tentative general recommended parameters for
classical security level and that we reproduce here in Table 4.
DL Algorithm AES-128 AES-192 AES-256
NFS 3072 7680 15360
exTNFS 3618 9241 18480
SexTNFS 5004 12871 27410
Table 4. Recommended extension fields size (pk) to obtain desired levels of security [41].
Following the Table 4, we searched for new parameters that will ensure resistance to SexTNFS
algorithm at the various security levels for curves of embedding degrees 9, 15 and 27.
9.1 New parameters and costs for optimal ate pairing at the 128-bit security
level for k = 9 and k = 15
– Case of k = 9. Following the recommendation from Table 4, we found the value x = 270 +
259+246+241+1. This gives a prime p of 559 bits and a prime r of 419 bits. We proceed as
described in Section 5 to obtain the cost of the Miller loop and the final exponentiation. The
Miller loop costs in this case 70(9M1 + 3M3 + 9S3) + 4(9M1 + 12M3 + 5S3) + 69S9 + 73M9.
This is equal to 73M9 + 258M3 + 666M1 + 69S9 + 650S3. Using the arithmetic in Table 2,
the overall cost is 4842M1 + 4975S1. Using the value of x given above, the hard part of
the final exponentiation costs 2(70S9 + 3M9) + 5(70S9 + 4M9) + 7M9 + 1S9 + 2IGφ3(p3)
=
491S9 + 33M9 + 2IGφ3(p3)
and p, p2, p3, p4, p5-Frobenius maps. The total cost of the final
exponentiation is 1I9 + 34M9 + 491S9 + 2IGφ3(p3)
and p, p2, 2 ∗ p3, p4, p5-Frobenius maps for
a total cost of I1 + 1367M1 + 12317S1.
– Case of k = 15. Following the recommendation from Table 4, we found the value x =
231 + 219 + 25 + 22. This gives a prime p of 371 bits and a prime r of 249 bits which is
closed to 256 bits as required to have 128 bits on the curve side. We proceed as described in
section 6 to obtain the cost of the Miller loop and the final exponentiation. The Miller loop
costs in this case 3(15M1 + 13M5 + 3S5) + 31(15M1 + 6M5 + 7S5) + 30S15 + 33M15. This
is equal to 33M15 + 225M5 + 510M1 + 30S15 + 226S5. Using the arithmetic in Table 2, the
overall cost is 4020M1 +3384S1. Using the value of x given above, the hard part of the final
exponentiation costs 2(31S15+4M15+1IGφ3(p5)
)+9(31S15+3M15)+20M15+1S15+4IGφ3(p5)
=
55M15+342S15+6IGφ3(p5)
and p, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8, p9-Frobenius maps. The total cost of
the final exponentiation is I15+56M15+342S15+6IGφ3(p5)
and p, p2, p3, p4, 2∗p5, p6, p7, p8, p9-
Frobenius maps for a total cost of I1 + 2940M1 + 15575S1.
The following table 5 compares our results with previous results at the 128-bit security level.
Curves-Ref. Miller loop Final Exp. Size of p Total(S1 =M1)
k = 15 4020M1 + 3384S1 I1 + 2940M1 371 I1 + 25919M1
(This work) +15575S1
KSS16 [4] 7534M1 I1 + 18542M1 340 I1 + 26076M1
BLS12 [4] 7708M1 I1 + 8295M1 461 I1 + 16003M1
BN12 [4,2] 12068M1 I1 + 7485M1 461 I1 + 19553M1
k = 9 4842M1 + 4975S1 I1 + 1367M1 559 I1 + 23501M1
(This work) +12317S1
Table 5. Comparison of the cost of the Miller loop and the final exponentiation at 128-bit security level.
9.2 New parameters and costs for pairings at the 192- bit security levels for
k = 15 and k = 27
– Case of k = 15. Following the recommendation from Table 4, we found the value x =
272+240+29+25+1. This gives a prime p of 863 bits and a prime r of 577 bits. We proceed
as described in section 6 to obtain the cost of the Miller loop and the final exponentiation. The
Miller loop costs in this case 4(15M1+13M5+3S5)+72(15M1+6M5+7S5)+71S15+75M15.
This is equal to 75M15+484M5+1140M1+71S15+516S5. Using the arithmetic in Table 2,
the overall cost is 8871M1 + 7839S1. Using the value of x given above, the hard part of the
final exponentiation costs 2(72S15 + 3M15) + 9(72S15 + 4M15) + 20M15 + 1S15 + 4IGφ3(p5)
=
62M15+793S15+4IGφ3(p5)
and p, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8, p9-Frobenius maps. The total cost of
the final exponentiation is I15+63M15+793S15+4IGφ3(p5)
and p, p2, p3, p4, 2∗p5, p6, p7, p8, p9-
Frobenius maps for a total cost of I1 + 3201M1 + 35816S1.
– Case of k = 27. Following the recommendation from Table 4, we found the value x = 225 +
214+217+24+1. This gives a prime p of 511 bits and a prime factor of r of 410 bits. We proceed
as described in section 7 to obtain the cost of the Miller loop and the final exponentiation. The
Miller loop costs in this case 4(9M1+1I9+2S9+3M9)+25(9M1+1I9+2S9+3M9)+24S27+
27M27. This is equal to 29I9+27M27 +87M9+261M1+24S27+58S9. Using the arithmetic
in Table 2, the overall cost is 29I1 + 11052M1 + 4798S1. Using the value of x given above,
the final exponentiation costs I27+2(25S27+3M27)+ 17(25S27 +4M27)+ 11M27+2IGφ3(p9)
and p, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8, 2∗p9-Frobenius maps for a total cost of the final exponentiation
I1 + 19191M1 + 59587S1.
The cost for the case k = 24 are obtained with the parameter given in [4] and the formulas
from [2]
The following table 6 compares our results with previous results at the 192-bit security level.
Curves-Ref. Miller loop Final Exp. Size of p Total(S1 =M1)
k = 15 8871M1 + 7839S1 I1 + 3201M1 863 I1 + 55727M1
(This work) +35816S1
BLS27 29I1 + 11052M1 I1 + 19191M1 511 30I1 + 94628M1
(This work) +4798S1 +59587S1
KSS18 [4] 15270M1 + 2590S1 8I1 + 7977M1 677 8I1 + 44147M1
+18310S1
BLS24 [4,2] 15495M1 10I1 + 27914M1 554 10I1 + 43409M1
Table 6. Comparison of the cost of the Miller loop and the final exponentiation at 192-bit security level.
9.3 New parameters and costs for pairings at the 256- bits security levels for
k = 27 and k = 24
– Case of k = 27. Following the recommendation from Table 4, we found the value x =
251 + 242 + 228 + 29 + 1. This gives a prime p of 1019 bits and a prime factor of r of 883
bits. We proceed as described in section 7 to obtain the cost of the Miller loop and the final
exponentiation. The Miller loop costs in this case 4(9M1+1I9+2S9+3M9)+51(9M1+1I9+
2S9+3M9)+50S27+53M27. This is equal to 55I9+53M27+165M9+495M1+50S27+110S9.
Using the arithmetic in Table 2, the overall cost is 55I1+21348M1+9660S1. Using the value
of x given above, the final exponentiation costs I27+2(51S27 +3M27) + 17(51S27 +4M27)+
11M27 + 2IGφ3(p9)
and p, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8, 2 ∗ p9-Frobenius maps for a total cost of the
final exponentiation I1 + 19191M1 + 122337S1.
The cost for the case k = 24 are obtained with the parameter given in [4] and the formulas
from [2]
The following table 7 compares our results with previous results at the 256-bit security level.
9.4 Comparison
To make a fair comparison of the results in tables 5, 6 and 7, we take note of the size of the
base field. We consider implementations on 64-bit platform. Then following [2], a Fp element
is represented with ℓ = 1 + log2(p) binary coefficients packed in n64 = ⌈
ℓ
64⌉64 bits processor
words and a Fp multiplication can be implemented with approximately 2n
2
64 + n64 operations.
Curves-Ref. Miller loop Final Exp. Size of p Total(S1 =M1)
k = 27 55I1 + 21348M1 I1 + 19191M1 1019 56I1 + 172536M1
(This work) +9660S1 +122337S1
BLS24[4,2] 18812M1 10I1 + 43142M1 1029 10I1 + 61954M1
KSS18[4] 32238M1 + 2620S1 8I1 + 7977M1 1495 8I1 + 82355M1
+39520S1
Table 7. Comparison of the cost of the Miller loop and the final exponentiation at 256-bit security level.
We denote mc the cost of a multiplication in the finite field Fp where p is of c bits. For the Table
5 we have that m461 ≈ 1.35m371. From this we see that, at the 128-bit security level, the total
cost of computing the optimal ate pairing for elliptic curves with k = 15 is 19199m461 making
these curves faster than the well known BN curves but slower than the KSS16 curves found in [4]
as the best one at the 128-bit security level. From Table 6 we have that the cost for computing
the optimal ate pairing for curves with k = 15 is 166067m511 as m863 ≈ 2.98m511 . We conclude
that at the 192-bit security level computing the optimal ate pairing is faster on elliptic curves
with embedding degree k = 27 than on curves with k = 15 and in this case the BLS24 curves
remain faster. At the 256-bit security level, we have that the BLS24 curves are the faster.
10 Conclusion
In this work we provided details and important improvements in the computation of the Miller
loop and the final exponentiation for the optimal ate pairing on elliptic curves admitting cubic
twists. An explicit cost evaluation is given for the Miller loop in the case of elliptic curves of
embedding degree 9 and 15. In particular for k = 15 and k = 27 we obtained an improvement,
in terms of operations in the base field, of up to 25% and 29% respectively in the computation
of the final exponentiation. Also, we obtained that elliptic curves with embedding degree k = 15
present faster results than BN12 curves at the 128-bit security levels. In comparison with curves
having even embedding degrees we find that a lot of improvements are still required in the case
of curves with odd embedding degree. One could try to compute compressed squarings in this
case. To ensure the correctness of all the formulas used in this work, a MAGMA code for the
implementation of the three pairings is given. Furthermore, a brief look at the parameters used
in this work reveals that the curves with odd embedding degrees studied in this work are not
subgroup secure ordinary curves [6] and are not protected against small-subgroup attacks[34].
However this is not a particular case of elliptic curves of odd embedding degree but it appears
from [6] that most of such parameters that have been found for curves with even embedding
degree such as BN12 curves [8], KSS16 curves [26] or BLS12 curves [7] do not satisfied these
security properties. As future work we could search for parameters to fulfill this security issue.
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A Arithmetic in Fp9
Let a = a0 + a1v + a2v
2 ∈ Fp9 with ai ∈ Fp3.
A.1 Cyclotomic inversion
We assume that a lies in the cyclotomic subgroup Gφ3(p3), so that a
p6+p3+1 = 1 i.e. a−1 = ap
6
ap
3
.
In order to compute ap
6
ap
3
, we need the values of vp
3
and vp
6
. But vp
3
= v3(p
3
−1)/3+1 =
v3(p
3
−1)/3v = (v3)(p
3
−1)/3v = (71/3)(p
3
−1)/3v since v3 = 71/3.
Let µ = (71/3)(p
3
−1)/3; we have µ 6= 1 and µ3 = 1 so that µ is a primitive cubic root of
unity in Fp3 . We obtain v
p3 = µv and vp
6
= (vp
3
)p
3
= (µv)p
3
= µ(v)p
3
= µµv = µ2v. We
then have ap
3
= ap
3
0 + a
p3
1 v
p3 + ap
3
2 (v
2)p
3
= a0 + a1v
p3 + a2(v
2)p
3
= a0 + a1µv + a2µ
2v2 and
ap
6
= (ap
3
)p
3
= a0+ a1(µv)
p3 + a2(µ
2v2)p
3
= a0+ a1µ
2v+ a2µ
4v2. So that when using v3 = 71/3
and φ3(µ) = µ
2 + µ+ 1 = 0, we finally have:
ap
6
ap
3
= (a20 − a1a27
1/3) + (a227
1/3 − a0a1)v + (a
2
1 − a0a2)v
2
This costs 3M3 + 3S3 = 18M1 + 15S1 with additional additions.
A.2 Frobenius operators
The pi−Frobenius is the map πi: Fp9 → Fp9 , a 7→ a
pi . Let a ∈ Fp9 , a = a0 + a1v + a2v
2 with
ai ∈ Fp3 then π(a) = a
p
0 + a
p
1v
p + ap2(v
2)p. Now a0 ∈ Fp3 can be written as a0 = g0 + g1u+ g2u
2,
gi ∈ Fp so that a
p
0 = g0 + g1u
p + g2(u
2)p.
We have up = u3(p−1)/3+1 = (u3)(p−1)/3u = 7(p−1)/3u and since 7 is not a cube in Fp, 7
(p−1)/3 6= 1.
Let α = 7(p−1)/3 then α 6= 1 and α3 = 1; it means that α is a primitive cubic root of unity
in Fp and u
p = αu. Therefore ap0 = g0 + g1u
p + g2(u
2)p = g0 + g1αu + g2α
2u2 and similarly
ap1 = g3 + g4u
p + g5(u
2)p = g3 + g4αu+ g5α
2u2 and
ap2 = g6 + g7u
p + g8(u
2)p = g6 + g7αu + g8α
2u2. Now for the computation of vp observe that
vp = v3(p−1)/3+1 = (v3)(p−1)/3v = (71/3)(p−1)/3v = 7(p−1)/9v so that if β = 7(p−1)/9 then we have
β 6= 1, β3 = 7(p−1)/3 = α 6= 1, β9 = 1. Thus β is a primitive ninth root of unity in Fp and
vp = βv.
Finally ap = g0 + g1αu+ g2α
2u2 + (g3β + g4αβu+ g5α
2βu2)v + (g6β
2 + g7αβ
2u+ g8α
2β2u2)v2
and the following algebraic relations: α = β3, αβ = β4, αβ2 = β5, α2β = β7, α2β2 = β8 yield
to ap = (g0 + g1β
3u+ g2β
6u2) + (g3β + g4β
4u+ g5β
7u2)v + (g6β
2 + g7β
5u+ g8β
8u2)v2.
The cost of p-Frobenius: 8M1. This is the same as the cost of p
2, p4, p5, p7 and p8-Frobenius.
For the p3-Frobenius operator, observe from A.1 that vp
3
= µv. Then
ap
3
= a0 + a1µv + a2µ
2v2 = (g0 + g1u+ g2u
2) + (g3 + g4u+ g5u
2)µv + (g6 + g7u+ g8u
2)µ2v2.
As t = µ2 is precomputed; we finally have
ap
3
= (g0 + g1u+ g2u
2) + (g3µ+ g4µu+ g5µu
2)v + (g6t+ g7tu+ g8tu
2)v2.
The cost of p3-Frobenius: 6M1. This is the same as the cost of p
6-Frobenius.
B Arithmetic in Fp27
B.1 Cyclotomic inversion
We follow the same procedure as in A.1. The element a = a0 + a1w+ a2w
2 ∈ Fp27 with ai ∈ Fp9
in the cyclotomic subgroup Gφ3(Fp9 ) satisfies a
p18+p9+1 = 1 so that a−1 = ap
18
ap
9
.
In order to compute ap
18
ap
9
, we need the values of wp
9
and wp
18
. We have
wp
9
= w3(p
9
−1)/3+1 = w3(p
9
−1)/3w = (w3)(p
9
−1)/3w = (71/9)(p
9
−1)/3w since w3 = 71/9. Let
σ = (71/9)(p
9
−1)/3 then σ 6= 1 and σ3 = 1. Hence σ is a primitive cubic root of unity in Fp9
i.e. φ3(σ) = 0. We obtain w
p9 = σw and we now compute wp
18
as wp
18
= (wp
9
)p
9
= (σw)p
9
=
σ(w)p
9
= σσw = σ2w.
ap
9
= a0 + a1w
p9 + a2(w
2)p
9
= a0 + a1σw + a2σ
2w2 and
ap
18
= (ap
9
)p
9
= a0 + a1(σw)
p9 + a2(σ
2w2)p
9
= a0 + a1σ
2w + a2σ
4w2. After expanding and
reducing using w3 = 71/9 and φ3(σ) = σ
2 + σ + 1 = 0 we obtain
ap
18
ap
9
= (a20 − a1a27
1/9) + (a227
1/9 − a0a1)w + (a
2
1 − a0a2)w
2
The computation costs 3(36M1) + 3(25S1) = 108M1 + 75S1.
B.2 Frobenius operators
The pi−Frobenius is the map πi: Fp27 → Fp27 , a 7→ a
pi . Let a = a0 + a1w + a2w
2 with ai ∈ Fp9
an element of Fp27 .
π(a) = ap = (a0 + a1w + a2w
2)p = ap0 + a
p
1w
p + ap2(w
2)p. The element a0 ∈ Fp9 can be written
as a0 = (h0 + h1u + h2u
2) + (h3 + h4u + h5u
2)v + (h6 + h7u + h8u
2)v2, hi ∈ Fp. We have
ap0 = (h0 + h1u+ h2u
2 + (h3 + h4u+ h5u
2)v + (h6 + h7u+ h8u
2)v2)p, hpi = hi.
up = u3(p−1)/3+1 = (u3)(p−1)/3u = 7(p−1)/3u. Since 7 is not a cube in Fp, we have α = 7
(p−1)/3
α 6= 1 and α3 = 1. It means that α is a primitive cubic root of unity in Fp and u
p = αu.
vp = v3(p−1)/3+1 = (v3)(p−1)/3v = (71/3)(p−1)/3v = 7(p−1)/9v.
We have β = 7(p−1)/9 6= 1 and β9 = 1. Thus β is a primitive ninth root of unity in Fp and
vp = βv. Also wp = w3(p−1)/3+1 = (w3)(p−1)/3v = (71/9)(p−1)/3v = 7(p−1)/27v. We also observe
that γ = 7(p−1)/27 6= 1, γ3 = 7(p−1)/9 = β 6= 1, γ9 = 7(p−1)/3 = α 6= 1, γ27 = 1. Thus γ is a
primitive twenty-seventh root of unity in Fp and w
p = γw.
ap0 = ((h0 + h1u+ h2u
2) + (h3 + h4u+ h5u
2)v + (h6 + h7u+ h8u
2)v2)p
= (h0 + h1u
p + h2(u
2)p) + (h3 + h4u
p + h5(u
2)p)vp + (h6 + h7u
p + h8(u
2)p)(v2)p
= (h0 + h1αu+ h2α
2u2) + (h3 + h4αu+ h5α
2u2)βv + (h6 + h7αu+ h8α
2u2)β2v2
= (h0 + h1αu+ h2α
2u2) + (h3β + h4αβu+ h5α
2βu2)v + (h6β
2 + h7αβ
2u+ h8α
2β2u2)v2.
ap1 = (h9 + h10u+ h11u
2) + (h12 + h13u+ h14u
2)v + (h15 + h16u+ h17u
2)v2)p
= (h9 + h10u
p + h11(u
2)p) + (h12 + h13u
p + h14(u
2)p)vp + (h15 + h16u
p + h17(u
2)p)(v2)p
= (h9 + h10αu+ h11α
2u2) + (h12 + h13αu+ h14α
2u2)βv + (h15 + h16αu+ h17α
2u2)β2v2
= (h9 + h10αu+ h11α
2u2) + (h12β + h13αβu+ h14α
2βu2)v + (h15β
2 + h16αβ
2u+
h17α
2β2u2)v2.
ap2 = (h18 + h19u+ h20u
2) + (h21 + h22u+ h23u
2)v + (h24 + h25u+ h26u
2)v2)p
= (h18 + h19u
p + h20(u
2)p) + (h21 + h22u
p + h23(u
2)p)vp + (h24 + h25u
p + h26(u
2)p)(v2)p
= (h18 + h19αu+ h20α
2u2) + (h21 + h22αu+ h23α
2u2)βv + (h24 + h25αu+ h26α
2u2)β2v2.
= (h18 + h19αu+ h20α
2u2) + (h21β + h22αβu+ h23α
2βu2)v + (h24β
2 + h25αβ
2u+
h26α
2β2u2)v2.
π(a) = (a0 + a1w + a2w
2)p = ap0 + a
p
1w
p + ap2(w
2)p = ap0 + a
p
1γw + a
p
2γ
2w2
= (h0+h1αu+h2α
2u2)+ (h3β+h4αβu+h5α
2βu2)v+(h6β
2+h7αβ
2u+h8α
2β2u2)v2+
((h9 + h10αu+ h11α
2u2) + (h12β + h13αβu+ h14α
2βu2)v + (h15β
2 + h16αβ
2u+
h17α
2β2u2)v2)γw + ((h18 + h19αu+ h20α
2u2) + (h21β + h22αβu+ h23α
2βu2)v+
(h24β
2 + h25αβ
2u+ h26α
2β2u2)v2)γ2w2.
We have these following algebraic relations: α = β3, αβ = β4, αβ2 = β5, α2β = β7 and
α2β2 = β8. Therefore
π(a) = ((h0 + h1β
3u+ h2β
6u2) + (h3β + h4β
4u+ h5β
7u2)v + (h6β
2 + h7β
5u+ h8β
8u2)v2)+
((h9γ + h10β
3γu+ h11β
6γu2) + (h12βγ + h13β
4γu+ h14β
7γu2)v + (h15β
2γ + h16β
5γu+
h17β
8γu2)v2)w+((h18γ
2+h19β
3γ2u+h20β
6γ2u2)+ (h21βγ
2+h22β
4γ2u+h23β
7γ2u2)v+
(h24β
2γ2 + h25β
5γ2u+ h26β
8γ2u2)v2)w2.
The following values are precomputed: λ0 = β
2, λ1 = β
3, λ2 = β
4, λ3 = β
5, λ4 = β
6, λ5 = β
7,
λ6 = β8, λ7 = γ
2 , λ8 = βγ, λ9 = λ0γ, λ10 = λ1γ, λ11 = λ2γ, λ12 = λ3γ, λ13 = λ4γ,
λ14 = λ5γ, λ15 = λ6γ, λ16 = λ0λ7, λ17 = λ1λ7, λ18 = λ2λ7, λ19 = λ3λ7, λ20 = λ4λ7, λ21 = λ5λ7,
λ22 = λ6λ7. λ23 = βλ7.
Thus π(a) = ((h0 + h1λ1u+ h2λ4u
2) + (h3β + h4λ2u+ h5λ5u
2)v + (h6λ0 + h7λ3u+
h8λ6u
2)v2) + ((h9γ + h10λ10u+ h11λ13u
2) + (h12λ8 + h13λ11u+ h14λ14u
2)v+
(h15λ9 + h16λ12u+ h17λ15u
2)v2)w + ((h18λ7 + h19λ17u+ h20λ20u
2) + (h21λ23+
h22λ18u+ h23λ21u
2)v + (h24λ16 + h25λ19u+ h26λ22u
2)v2)w2.
The cost of p-Frobenius: 26M1 +18a. This is also equal to the cost of p
2, p4, p5, p7, p8 Frobenius
For the p9 Frobenius operator, observe from B.1 that wp
9
= σw. Then
ap
9
= a0 + a1σw + a2σ
2w2 = ((h0 + h1u+ h2u
2) + (h3 + h4u+ h5u
2)v + (h6 + h7u+
h8u
2)v2)+ ((h9+h10u+h11u
2)+ (h12+h13u+h14u
2)v+(h15+h16u+h17u
2)v2)σw+
((h18 + h19u+ h20u
2) + (h21 + h22u+ h23u
2)v + (h24 + h25u+ h26u
2)v2)σ2w2.
We then have ap
9
= ((h0 + h1u+ h2u
2) + (h3 + h4u+ h5u
2)v + (h6 + h7u+ h8u
2)v2)+
((h9σ+h10σu+h11σu
2)+ (h12σ+h13σu+h14σu
2)v+(h15σ+h16σu+
h17σu
2)v2)w + ((h18σ
2 + h19σ
2u+ h20σ
2u2) + (h21σ
2 + h22σ
2u+
h23σ
2u2)v + (h24σ
2 + h25σ
2u+ h26σ
2u2)v2)w2.
As s = σ2 is precomputed; we have ap
9
= ((h0+h1u+h2u
2)+(h3+h4u+h5u
2)v+(h6+h7u+
h8u
2)v2)+((h9σ+h10σu+h11σu
2)+(h12σ+h13σu+h14σu
2)v+(h15σ+h16σu+h17σu
2)v2)w+
((h18s+ h19su+ h20su
2) + (h21s+ h22su+ h23su
2)v + (h24s+ h25su+ h26su
2)v2)w2.
The cost of p9-Frobenius: 18M1. This is the same as the cost of p
3 and p6 Frobenius.
C Arithmetic in Fp15
The arithmetic of the extension field Fp5 is studied in [39]. In this section we only consider
inversion in cyclotomic subgroup and Frobenius operators.
C.1 Cyclotomic inversion
An element a = a0+a1v+a2v
2 ∈ Fp15 with ai ∈ Fp5 in the cyclotomic subgroup Gφ3(p5) satisfies
ap
10+p5+1 = 1 so that a−1 = ap
10
ap
5
.
vp
5
= v5(p
5
−1)/5+1 = v5(p
5
−1)/5v = (v5)(p
5
−1)/5v = (71/3)(p
5
−1)/5v since v5 = 71/3.
Let ω = (71/3)(p
5
−1)/5. We have ω 6= 1 and ω5 = 1. Hence ω is a primitive fifth root of unity in
Fp5 . We obtain v
p5 = ωv, and vp
10
= (vp
5
)p
5
= (ωv)p
5
= ω(v)p
5
= ωωv = ω2v.
ap
5
= (a0+a1v+a2v
2)p
5
= ap
5
0 +a
p5
1 v
p5+ap
5
2 (v
2)p
5
= a0+a1v
p5+a2(v
2)p
5
= a0+a1ωv+a2ω
2v2.
ap
10
= (ap
5
)p
5
= a0 + a1(ωv)
p5 + a2(ω
2v2)p
5
= a0 + a1ω
2v + a2ω
4v2.
ap
10
ap
5
= (a0 + a1ω
2v + a2ω
4v2)(a0 + a1ωv + a2ω
2v2)
After expanding and reducing using v3 = u and φ5(ω) = 0 we obtain
ap
10
ap
5
= (a20 + (1 + ω
4)a1a2u) + ω(a
2
2u+ (1 + ω)a0a1)v + ω
2(a21ω + (1 + ω
2)a0a2)v
2
This costs 3(9M1) + 3(9S1) = 27M1 + 27S1
C.2 Frobenius operators
The pi−Frobenius is the map πi: Fp15 → Fp15 , a 7→ a
pi . Let a ∈ Fp15 ; a = a0 + a1v + a2v
2
with ai ∈ Fp5 . π(a) = a
p = (a0 + a1v + a2v
2)p = ap0 + a
p
1v
p + ap2(v
2)p. As a0 ∈ Fp5 i.e. a0 =
g0 + g1u + g2u
2 + g3u
3 + g4u
4, gi ∈ Fp, we have a
p
0 = (g0 + g1u + g2u
2 + g3u
3 + g4u
4)p =
g0 + g1u
p + g2(u
2)p + g3(u
3)p + g4(u
4)p, since gpi = gi.
Now we have up = u5(p−1)/5+1 = (u5)(p−1)/5u = 7(p−1)/5u and as 7 is not a fifth power in Fp; so
7(p−1)/5 6= 1. Let θ = 7(p−1)/5, θ 6= 1 and θ5 = 1. It means that θ is a primitive fifth root of unity in
Fp and u
p = θu. ap0 = g0+g1u
p+g2(u
2)p+g3(u
3)p+g4(u
4)p = g0+g1θu+g2θ
2u2+g3θ
3u3+g4θ
4u4.
ap1 = g5 + g6u
p + g7(u
2)p + g8(u
3)p + g9(u
4)p = g5 + g6θu+ g7θ
2u2 + g8θ
3u3 + g9θ
4u4.
ap2 = g10 + g11u
p + g12(u
2)p + g13(u
3)p + g14(u
4)p = g10 + g11θu+ g12θ
2u2 + g13θ
3u3 + g14θ
4u4.
vp = v5(p−1)/5+1 = (v5)(p−1)/5v = (71/3)(p−1)/5v = (71/3)(p−1)/5v. 71/3 is not a fifth power in Fp;
so (71/3)(p−1)/5 6= 1.
Set β = (71/3)(p−1)/5, we have β 6= 1; β5 = 1. Thus β is a primitive fifth root of unity in Fp and
vp = βv. ap = (a0+a1v+a2v
2)p = ap0+a
p
1v
p+ap2(v
2)p = (g0+g1θu+g2θ
2u2+g3θ
3u3+g4θ
4u4)+
(g5+ g6θu+ g7θ
2u2+ g8θ
3u3+ g9θ
4u4)vp +(g10+ g11θu+ g12θ
2u2+ g13θ
3u3+ g14θ
4u4)(vp)2
= (g0 + g1θu + g2θ
2u2 + g3θ
3u3 + g4θ
4u4) + (g5β + g6θβu + g7θ
2βu2 + g8θ
3βu3 + g9θ
4βu4)v
+(g10β
2 + g11θβ
2u + g12θ
2β2u2 + g13θ
3β2u3 + g14θ
4β2u4)v2. We precomputed these following
values: c0 = θ
2 c1 = θ
3, c2 = θ
4, c3 = β
2, c4 = θβ, c5 = c0β, c6 = c1β, c7 = c2β, c8 = θc3,
c9 = c0c3, c10 = c1c3, c11 = c2c3. So π(a) = (g0 + g1θu + g2c0u
2 + g3c1u
3 + g4c2u
4) + (g5β +
g6c4u+ g7c5u
2 + g8c6u
3 +g9c7u
4)v + (g10c3 + g11c8u+ g12c9u
2 + g13c10u
3 + g14c11u
4)v2.
The cost of p-Frobenius is 14M1. This is the same cost as computing p
2, p3, p4,
p6, p7, p8, p9 Frobenius.
For the p5 Frobenius operator, observe from C.1 that vp
5
= ωv so that ap
5
= (g0 + g1u+ g2u
2+
g3u
3 + g4u
4) + (g5 + g6u+ g7u
2 + g8u
3 + g9u
4)vp
5
+ (g10 + g11u
+g12u
2 + g13u
3 + g14u
4)(vp
5
)2.
= (g0 + g1u+ g2u
2 + g3u
3 + g4u
4) + (g5ω + g6ωu+ g7ωu
2 + g8ωu
3 + g9ωu
4)v
+(g10ω
2 + g11ω
2u+ g12ω
2u2 + g13ω
2u3 + g14ω
2u4)v2.
We precomputed d = ω2.
π5(a) = ap
5
= (g0+g1u+g2u
2+g3u
3+g4u
4)+(g5ω+g6ωu+g7ωu
2+g8ωu
3+g9ωu
4)v+(g10d+
g11du+ g12du
2 + g13du
3 + g14du
4)v2. The cost of p5-Frobenius is 10M1. This is the same as the
cost of p10 Frobenius.
